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Abstract
In this work, pseudorandom sequence generators based on finite fields
have been analyzed from the point of view of their cryptographic applica-
tion. In fact, a class of nonlinear sequence generators has been modelled
in terms of linear cellular automata. The algorithm that converts the
given generator into a linear model based on automata is very simple and
is based on the concatenation of a basic structure. Once the generator
has been linearized, a cryptanalytic attack that exploits the weaknesses of
such a model has been developed. Linear cellular structures easily model
sequence generators with application in stream cipher cryptography.
Keywords: automata, finite fields, cryptography, sequence generator.
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1 Introduction
Confidential information must be encrypted by means of a mathematical func-
tion currently called cipher that converts the original information (plaintext)
into the ciphered information (ciphertext). Symmetric cryptography is usually
divided into two large classes [21]: stream ciphers and block-ciphers. Stream
ciphers encrypt each data symbol into a ciphertext symbol under a time-varying
transformation. Block-ciphers divide the plaintext into blocks of symbols and
by means of a specially constructed function mix the block of plaintext with the
secret key in order to produce the block of ciphertext.
Stream ciphers are very fast (in fact, the fastest among the encryption pro-
cedures) so they are implemented in many technological applications e.g. al-
gorithms A5 in GSM communications or the encryption system E0 used in the
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Bluetooth specifications or the RC4 function for the application Excel of Mi-
crosoft. Stream ciphers try to imitate the ultimate one-time pad cipher [21] and
are supposed to be good pseudorandom generators capable of stretching a short
secret seed (the secret key) into a long sequence of seemingly random bits (the
keystream sequence). This sequence is then bit-wise XORed with the plaintext
in order to obtain the ciphertext. Finite fields are used in most of the construc-
tions of pseudorandom sequences either under the form of Cellular Automata
(CA) or under the form of traditional Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs).
Cellular Automata (CA) are particular forms of finite state machines that
can be investigated by the usual analytic techniques ([10], [18], [20], [26]). CA
have been used in application areas so different as physical system simulation,
biological process, species evolution, socio-economical models or test pattern
generation. They are defined as arrays of identical cells in an n-dimensional
space and characterized by different parameters [27]: the cellular geometry, the
neighborhood specification, the number of contents per cell and the transition
rule to compute the successor state. Their simple, modular and cascable struc-
ture makes them very attractive for VLSI implementations.
On the other hand, LFSRs [11] are linear structures currently used in the
generation of pseudorandom sequences. The inherent simplicity of LFSRs, their
ease of implementation and the good statistical properties of their output se-
quences turn them into natural building blocks for the design of pseudorandom
sequence generators with applications in spread-spectrum communications, cir-
cuit testing, error-correcting codes, numerical simulations or cryptography.
In recent years, one-dimensional CA have been proposed as an alternative to
LFSRs ([2], [3], [20], [27]) in the sense that every sequence generated by a LFSR
can be obtained from one-dimensional CA too. In cryptographic applications,
pseudorandom sequence generators currently involve several LFSRs combined
by means of nonlinear functions or irregular clocking techniques (see [19], [21]).
Moreover in [22], it is proved that one-dimensional linear CA are isomorphic to
conventional LFSRs. Thus, the latter structures can be simply substituted by
the former ones in order to accomplish the same goal: generation of keystream
sequences.
The above class of linear CA has been found to satisfy randomness properties
with application in the testing of digital circuits and self-checking [28]. The
current interest of these CA stems from the lack of correlation between the
bit sequences generated by adjacent cells, see [9]. In this sense, linear CA are
superior to the more common LFSRs [11] that have been traditionally used
in stream ciphers. Nevertheless, the main advantage of CA is that multiple
generators designed as nonlinear structures in terms of LFSRs preserve the
linearity when they are expressed under the form of CA.
This paper considers the problem of finding one-dimensional CA that re-
produce the output sequence of a particular LFSR-based generator. More pre-
cisely, in this work a wide class of LFSR-based nonlinear generators, the so-
called Clock-Controlled Shrinking Generators (CCSGs) [15], can be described
in terms of one-dimensional CA configurations. Indeed, the well known Shrink-
ing Generator [8] is just an element of such a class. The automata here presented
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unify in a simple structure the above mentioned class of sequence generators.
The algorithm that converts a given CCSG into a CA-based linear model is
very simple and can be applied to CCSGs in a range of practical interest. The
underlying idea of this modelling procedure is the concatenation of a basic au-
tomaton. Once the generators have been linearized, a cryptanalytic approach
to reconstruct the generated sequence is also presented.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, the basic structures consid-
ered, e.g. one-dimensional CA and CCSGs, are introduced. A simple algorithm
to determine the pair of CA corresponding to a particular shrinking generator
and its generalization to Clock-Controlled Shrinking Generators are given in
sections 3 and 4, respectively. A method of reconstructing the generated se-
quence that exploits the linearity of the CA-based model is presented in section
5. Finally, conclusions in section 6 end the paper.
2 Basic Structures
In the following subsections, we introduce the general characteristics of the basic
structures we are dealing with: linear feedback shift registers, one-dimensional
cellular automata, the shrinking generator and the class of clock-controlled
shrinking generators. The work is restricted to binary structures, that is the
contents of CA as well as those of LFSRs belong to GF (2).
2.1 Linear Feedback Shift Registers
A binary LFSR is an electronic device with L memory cells (stages), numbered
0, 1, ..., L−1, each of one capable of storing one bit. The binary content of the L
stages at each unit of time is the state of the LFSR at that instant. In addition,
a clock controls the shift of data. At each unit of time the following operations
are performed: (i) The content of stage 0 is output ; (ii) the content of stage
i is moved to stage i − 1 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ L − 1 ; (iii) The new content of
stage L− 1 is the exclusive-OR of a subset of stages given by P (x), that is the
LFSR connection polynomial. If P (x) is a primitive polynomial of degree L [17],
then the LFSR is called a maximum-length LFSR and its output sequence is a
PN-sequence. Period, balancedness, run distribution and correlation properties
of PN-sequences have been exhaustively studied in the literature, see [11] and
[19]. In the sequel, only maximum-length LFSRs will be considered.
2.2 One-Dimensional Cellular Automata
One-dimensional cellular automata can be described as L-cell registers [4], whose
cell contents are updated at the same time instant according to a particular k -
variable function (the transition rule) denoted by Φ. If the function Φ is a linear
function, so is the cellular automaton. In addition, for cellular automata with
binary contents there can be up to 22
k
different mappings to the next state.
Moreover, if k = 2r + 1, then the binary content of the i-th cell at time t + 1
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depends on the contents of k neighbor cells at time t in the following way:
xt+1i = Φ(x
t
i−r , . . . , x
t
i, . . . , x
t
i+r) (i = 1, ..., L). (1)
The number of cells L (numbered from left to right) is the length of the
automaton. CA are called uniform whether all cells evolve under the same rule
while CA are called hybrid whether different cells evolve under different rules.
At the ends of the array, two different boundary conditions are possible: null
automata when cells with permanent null contents are supposed adjacent to the
extreme cells or periodic automata when extreme cells are supposed adjacent.
In this paper, only transition rules with k = 3 will be considered. Thus,
there are 28 of such rules among which just two (rule 90 and rule 150) lead to
non trivial machines. Such rules are described as follows :
Rule 90
xt+1i = Φ90(x
t
i−1, x
t
i, x
t
i+1) = x
t
i−1 + x
t
i+1
111 110 101 100 011 010 001 000
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
Rule 150
xt+1i = Φ150(x
t
i−1, x
t
i, x
t
i+1) = x
t
i−1 + x
t
i + x
t
i+1
111 110 101 100 011 010 001 000
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
Remark that the names rule 90 and rule 150 derive from the decimal values
of their next-state functions: 01011010 (binary) = 90 (decimal) and 10010110
(binary) = 150 (decimal). Indeed, xt+1i the content of the i-th cell at time t+1
depends on the contents of either two different cells (rule 90) or three different
cells (rule 150) at time t. The symbol + denotes addition modulo 2 among
cell contents. Remark that both transition rules are linear. This work deals
exclusively with one-dimensional linear null hybrid CA with rules 90 and 150.
A natural way of specifying such CA is an L-tuple M = [R1, R2, ..., RL], called
rule vector, where Ri = 0 if the i-th cell satisfies rule 90 while Ri = 1 if the
i-th cell satisfies rule 150. A sub-automaton of the previous automata class
consisting of cells 1 through i will be denoted by R1R2...Ri.
For a cellular automaton of length L = 10 cells, configuration rules (R1 =
0, R2 = 1, R3 = 1, R4 = 1, R5 = 0, R6 = 0, R7 = 1, R8 = 1, R9 = 1, R10 = 0 )
and initial state (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0), Table 1 illustrates the formation of its
output sequences (binary sequences read vertically) and the succession of states
(binary configurations of 10 bits read horizontally). For the above mentioned
rules, the different states of the automaton are grouped in closed cycles. The
number of different output sequences for a particular cycle is ≤ L as the same
sequence (although shifted) may appear simultaneously in different cells. At
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Table 1: An one-dimensional linear null hybrid cellular automaton of 10 cells
with rules 90/150 starting at a given initial state
90 150 150 150 90 90 150 150 150 90
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
the same time, all the sequences in a cycle will have the same period and linear
complexity [18]. Moreover, any of the output sequence of the automaton can be
produced at any cell provided that the right state cycle is chosen.
On the other hand, linear finite state machines are currently represented and
analyzed by means of their transition matrices. The form and characteristics of
these matrices for the CA under consideration can be found in [4]. In fact, such
matrices are tri-diagonal matrices with the rule vector on the main diagonal, 1’s
on the diagonals below and above the main one and all other entries being zero.
Every automaton is completely specified by its characteristic polynomial, that
is the characteristic polynomial of its transition matrix. Such a characteristic
polynomial can be computed in terms of the characteristic polynomials of the
previous sub-automata according to the recurrence relation [4]:
Pi(x) = (x +Ri)Pi−1(x) + Pi−2(x), 0 < i ≤ L (2)
being P−1(x) = 0 and P0(x) = 1. Next, the following definition is introduced:
Definition 2.1 A Multiplicative-Polynomial Cellular Automaton is defined as
a cellular automaton whose characteristic polynomial is a reducible polynomial
of the form PM (x) = (P (x))
p where p is a positive integer. If P (x) is a primitive
polynomial, then the automaton is called a Primitive Multiplicative-Polynomial
Cellular Automaton.
The class of binary sequence generators we are dealing with is described in the
following subsections.
2.3 The Shrinking Generator
The shrinking generator is a binary sequence generator [8] composed by two
LFSRs : a control register SR1 that decimates the sequence produced by the
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other register SR2. We denote by Lj (j = 1, 2) their corresponding lengths with
(L1, L2) = 1 as well as L1 < L2. Then, we denote by Cj(x) ∈ GF (2)[x] (j =
1, 2) their corresponding characteristic polynomials of degree Lj (j = 1, 2),
respectively.
The sequence produced by SR1, denoted by {ai}, controls the bits of the se-
quence produced by SR2, that is {bi}, which are included in the output sequence
{zj} (the shrunken sequence), according to the following rule P :
1. If ai = 1 =⇒ zj = bi
2. If ai = 0 =⇒ bi is discarded.
A simple example illustrates the behavior of this structure.
Example 2.2 Let us consider the following LFSRs:
1. Register SR1 of length L1 = 3, characteristic polynomial C1(x) = 1+x
2+
x3 and initial state IS1 = (1, 0, 0). The PN-sequence generated by SR1 is
{1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0} with period T1 = 2
L1 − 1 = 7.
2. Register SR2 of length L2 = 4, characteristic polynomial C2(x) = 1+x+x
4
and initial state IS2 = (1, 0, 0, 0). The PN-sequence generated by SR2 is
{1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1} with period T2 = 2
L2 − 1 = 15.
The output sequence {zj} is given by:
• {ai} → 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 .....
• {bi} → 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 .....
• {zj} → 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 .....
The underlined bits 0 or 1 in {bi} are discarded.
In brief, the sequence produced by the shrinking generator is an irregular
decimation of {bi} from the bits of {ai}. According to [8], the period of the
shrunken sequence is
T = (2L2 − 1)2(L1−1) (3)
and its linear complexity [21], notated LC, satisfies the following inequality
L2 2
(L1−2) < LC ≤ L2 2
(L1−1). (4)
A simple calculation, based on the fact that every state of SR2 coincides once
with every state of SR1, allows one to compute the number of 1’s in the shrunken
sequence. Such a number is constant and equal to
No. 1′s = 2(L2−1)2(L1−1). (5)
Comparing period and number of 1′s, it can be concluded that the shrunken
sequence is a quasi-balanced sequence.
In addition, it can be proved [8] that the output sequence has good distribu-
tional statistics too. Therefore, this scheme is suitable for practical implemen-
tation of stream ciphers and pattern generators.
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2.4 The Clock-Controlled Shrinking Generators
The Clock-Controlled Shrinking Generators constitute a wide class of clock-
controlled sequence generators [15] with applications in cryptography, error cor-
recting codes and digital signature. An CCSG is a sequence generator com-
posed of two LFSRs notated SR1 and SR2. The parameters of both regis-
ters are defined as those of subsection 2.3. At any time t, SR1 (the control
register) is clocked normally while the second register SR2 is clocked a num-
ber of times given by an integer decimation function notated Xt. In fact, if
A0(t), A1(t), . . . , AL1−1(t) are the binary cell contents of SR1 at time t, then
Xt is defined as
Xt = 1 + 2
0Ai0(t) + 2
1Ai1(t) + . . .+ 2
w−1Aiw−1(t) (6)
where i0, i1, . . . , iw−1 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L1 − 1} and 0 < w ≤ L1 − 1.
In this way, the output sequence of an CCSG is obtained from a double
decimation:
1. The output sequence of SR2, {bi}, is decimated by means of Xt giving
rise to the sequence {b′i}.
2. The same decimation rule P , defined in subsection 2.3, is applied to the
sequence {b′i}.
Remark that if Xt ≡ 1 (no cells are selected in SR1), then the proposed gener-
ator is just the shrinking generator. Let us see a simple example of CCSG.
Example 2.3 For the same LFSRs defined in the previous example and the
function Xt = 1+ 2
0A0(t) with w = 1, the decimated sequence {b
′
i} is given by:
• {bi} → 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 .....
• Xt → 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 .....
• {b′i} → 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 .....
According to the decimation function Xt, the underlined bits 0 or 1 in {bi} are
discarded in order to produce the sequence {b′i}. Then the output sequence {zj}
of the CCSG is given by:
• {ai} → 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 .....
• {b′i} → 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 .....
• {zj} → 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 .....
The underlined bits 0 or 1 in {b′i} are discarded.
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In brief, the sequence produced by an CCSG is an irregular double decima-
tion of the sequence generated by SR2 from the function Xt and the bits of SR1.
This construction allows one to generate a large family of different sequences by
using the same LFSR initial states and characteristic polynomials but modifying
the decimation function. Period, linear complexity and statistical properties of
the generated sequences by CCSGs have been established in [15].
2.5 Cattel and Muzio Synthesis Algorithm
The Cattell and Muzio synthesis algorithm [5] presents a method of obtaining
two CA (based on rules 90 and 150) corresponding to a given polynomial. Such
an algorithm takes as input an irreducible polynomial Q(x) ∈ GF (2)[x] defined
over a finite field and computes two linear reversal CA whose output sequences
have Q(x) as characteristic polynomial. Such CA are written as binary strings
with the previous codification: 0 = rule 90 and 1 = rule 150. The theoretical
foundations of the algorithm can be found in [7]. The total number of operations
required for this algorithm is listed in [5](Table II, page 334). It is shown that
the number of operations grows linearly with the degree of the polynomial, so
the method does not suffer from any sort of exponential blow-up. The method
is efficient for all practical applications (e.g. in 1996 finding a pair of length
300 CA took 16 CPU seconds on a SPARC 10 workstation). For cryptographic
applications, the degree of the irreducible (primitive) polynomial is L2 ≈ 64, so
that the consuming time is negligible.
Finally, a list of One-Dimensional Linear Hybrid Cellular Automata of De-
gree Through 500 can be found in [6].
3 CA-Based Linear Models for the Shrinking
Generator
In this section, an algorithm to determine the pair of CA corresponding to
a given shrinking generator is presented. Such an algorithm is based on the
following results:
Lemma 3.1 The characteristic polynomial of the shrunken sequence is of the
form P (x)N , where P (x) ∈ GF (2)[x] is a L2-degree primitive polynomial and
N is an integer satisfying the inequality 2(L1−2) < N ≤ 2(L1−1).
Proof: The shrunken sequence can be written as an interleaved sequence [12]
made out of an unique PN -sequence starting at different points and repeated
2(L1−1) times. Such a sequence is obtained from {bi} taking digits separated a
distance 2L1−1, that is the period of the sequence {ai}. As (2
L2−1, 2L1−1) = 1
due to the primality of L2 and L1, the result of the decimation of {bi} is a PN -
sequence of primitive characteristic polynomial P (x) of degree L2. Moreover, the
number of times that this PN -sequence is repeated coincides with the number of
1′s in {ai} since each 1 of {ai} provides the shrunken sequence with 2
L2−1 digits
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of {bi}. Consequently, the characteristic polynomial of the shrunken sequence
will be P (x)N with N ≤ 2(L1−1). The lower limit follows immediately from
equation (4) that defines the linear recurrence relationship.
Lemma 3.2 Let C2(x) ∈ GF (2)[x] be the characteristic polynomial of SR2 and
let λ be a root of C2(x) in the extension field GF (2
L2). Then, P (x) ∈ GF (2)[x]
is of the form
P (x) = (x+ λE)(x + λ2E) . . . (x+ λ2
L2−1E) (7)
being E an integer given by
E = 20 + 21 + . . .+ 2L1−1 . (8)
Proof: As the decimation of the sequence {bi} is realized taking one out of 2
L1−
1 digits, the obtained PN -sequence is nothing but the characteristic sequence
associated to the cyclotomic coset E = 2L1 − 1, see [11]. Hence, the roots
of its characteristic polynomial will be λE , λ2E , . . . , λ2
L2−1E . According to the
definition of cyclotomic coset, the value of E is given by equation (8).
Remark that P (x) depends exclusively on the characteristic polynomial of
the register SR2 and on the length L1 of the register SR1. Based on the Cattell
and Muzio synthesis algorithm [5], the following result is derived:
Lemma 3.3 Let Q(x) ∈ GF (2)[x] be a polynomial defined over a finite field
and let s1 and s2 two binary strings codifying the two linear CA obtained from
the Cattell and Muzio algorithm. Then, the two CA in form of binary strings
whose characteristic polynomial is Q(x)2 are:
S′i = Si ∗ S
∗
i i = 1, 2
where Si is the binary string si whose least significant bit has been complemented,
S∗i is the mirror image of Si and the symbol ∗ denotes concatenation.
Proof: The result is just a generalization of the Cattell and Muzio synthesis
algorithm. The concatenation is due to the fact that rule 90 (150) at the end
of the array in null automata is equivalent to two consecutive rules 150 (90)
with identical sequences. The fact of that an automaton and its reversal version
have the same characteristic polynomial completes the proof. Proceeding in the
same way a number of times, a multiplicative-polynomial cellular automaton
2.1 is obtained. In this way, the construction of a linear structure from the
concatenation of a basic automaton is accomplished.
According to the previous results, an algorithm to linearize the shrinking
generator is introduced:
Input: A shrinking generator characterized by two LFSRs, SR1 and SR2,
with their corresponding lengths, L1 and L2, and the characteristic polynomial
C2(x) of the register SR2.
9
Step 1 From L1 and C2(x), compute the polynomial P (x) in GF (2
L2) as
P (x) = (x + λE)(x + λ2E) . . . (x+ λ2
L2−1E)
with E = 20 + 21 + . . .+ 2L1−1.
Step 2 From P (x), apply the Cattell and Muzio synthesis algorithm to deter-
mine two linear CA (with rules 90 and 150), notated si, whose character-
istic polynomial is P (x).
Step 3 For each si separately, proceed:
3.1 Complement its least significant bit. The resulting binary string is
notated Si.
3.2 Compute the mirror image of Si, notated S
∗
i , and concatenate both
strings
S′i = Si ∗ S
∗
i .
3.3 Apply steps 3.1 and 3.2 to each S′i recursively L1 − 1 times.
Output: Two binary strings of length L = L2 · 2
L1−1 codifying two CA
corresponding to the given shrinking generator.
Remark 3.4 In this algorithm the characteristic polynomial of the register SR1
is not needed. Thus, all the shrinking generators with the same SR2 but different
registers SR1 (all of them with the same length L1) can be modelled by the same
pair of one-dimensional linear CA.
Remark 3.5 It can be noticed that the computation of both CA is proportional
to L1 concatenations. Consequently, the algorithm can be applied to shrinking
generators in a range of practical application.
Remark 3.6 In contrast to the nonlinearity of the shrinking generator, the
CA-based models that generate the shrunken sequence are linear.
In order to clarify the previous steps a simple numerical example is presented.
Input: A shrinking generator characterized by two LFSRs SR1 of length
L1 = 3 and SR2 of length L2 = 5 and characteristic polynomial C2(x) =
1 + x+ x2 + x4 + x5.
Step 1 P (x) is the characteristic polynomial of the cyclotomic coset E = 7.
Thus,
P (x) = 1 + x2 + x5 .
Step 2 From P (x) and applying the Cattell and Muzio synthesis algorithm,
two reversal linear CA whose characteristic polynomial is P (x) can be
determined. Such CA are written in binary format as:
10
0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0
Step 3 Computation of the required pair of CA.
For the first automaton:
0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
For the second automaton:
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
For each automaton, the procedure of concatenation has been carried out
L1 − 1 times.
Output: Two binary strings of length L = L2 · 2
(L1−1) = 20 codifying the
required pair of CA.
In this way, we have obtained a pair of linear CA able to generate the
shrunken sequence corresponding to the given shrinking generator. In addition,
for each one of the previous automata there is one state cycle where the shrunken
sequence is generated at each one of the cells.
4 CA-Based Linear Models for the Clock Con-
trolled Shrinking Generators
In this section, an algorithm to determine the pair of one-dimensional linear CA
corresponding to a given CCSG is presented. Such an algorithm is based on the
following results:
Lemma 4.1 The characteristic polynomial of the output sequence of a CCSG is
of the form P ′(x)N , where P ′(x) ∈ GF (2)[x] is a primitive L2-degree polynomial
and N is an integer satisfying the inequality 2(L1−2) < N ≤ 2(L1−1).
Proof: The proof is analogous to that one developed in lemma 3.1.
Remark that, according to the structure of the CCSGs, the polynomial P ′(x)
depends on the characteristic polynomial of the register SR2, the length L1 of
the register SR1 and the decimation function Xt. Before, P (x) was the charac-
teristic polynomial of the cyclotomic coset E, where E = 20 + 21 + . . .+ 2L1−1
was a fixed separation distance between the digits drawn from the sequence {bi}.
Now, this distance D is variable as well as a function of Xt. The computation
of D gives rise to the following result:
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Lemma 4.2 Let C2(x) ∈ GF (2)[x] be the characteristic polynomial of SR2 and
let λ be a root of C2(x) in the extension field GF (2
L2). Then, P ′(x) ∈ GF (2)[x]
is the characteristic polynomial of cyclotomic coset D, where D is given by
D = 2L1−w (
2w∑
i=1
i) − 1 = (1 + 2w) 2L1−1 − 1. (9)
Proof: The proof is analogous to that one developed in lemma 3.2. In fact,
the distance D can be computed taking into account that the function Xt takes
values in the interval [1, 2, . . . , 2w] and the number of times that each one of
these values appears in a period of the output sequence is given by 2L1−w. A
simple computation, based on the sum of the terms of an arithmetic progression,
completes the proof.
From the previous results, it can be noticed that the algorithm that deter-
mines the pair of CA corresponding to a given CCSG is analogous to that one
developed in section 3. Indeed, the expression of E in equation (8) must be
replaced by the expression of D in equation (9).
In order to clarify the previous steps a simple numerical example is presented.
Input: A CCSG characterized by: Two LFSRs SR1 of length L1 = 3 and
SR2 of length L2 = 5 and characteristic polynomial C2(x) = 1+x+x
2+x4+x5
plus the decimation function Xt = 1+ 2
0A0(t) + 2
1A1(t) + 2
2A2(t) with w = 3.
Step 1 P ′(x) is the characteristic polynomial of the cyclotomic coset D. Now
D ≡ 4 mod 31, that is we are dealing with the cyclotomic coset 1. Thus,
the corresponding characteristic polynomial is:
P ′(x) = 1 + x+ x2 + x4 + x5 .
Step 2 From P ′(x) and applying the Cattell and Muzio synthesis algorithm,
two reversal linear CA whose characteristic polynomial is P ′(x) can be
determined. Such CA are written in binary format as:
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
Step 3 Computation of the required pair of CA.
For the first automaton:
1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
For the second automaton:
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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For each automaton, the procedure of concatenation has been carried out
L1 − 1 times.
Output: Two binary strings of length L = 20 codifying the required CA.
Remark 4.3 From a point of view of the CA-based linear models, the shrinking
generator or any one of the CCGS are entirely analogous. Thus, the fact of
introduce an additional decimation function does neither increase the complexity
of the generator nor improve its resistance against cryptanalytic attacks. Indeed,
both kinds of generators can be linearized by the same class of CA-based models.
5 A Cryptanalytic Approach to this Class of Se-
quence Generators
Since CA-based linear models describing the behavior of CCSGs have been de-
rived, a cryptanalytic attack that exploits the weaknesses of these models has
been also developed. It consists in determining the initial states of both regis-
ters SR1 and SR2 from an amount of CCSG output sequence (the intercepted
sequence). In this way, the rest of the output sequence can be reconstructed.
For the sake of simplicity, the attack will be illustrated for the shrinking gener-
ator although the process can be extended to any CCSG. The proposed attack
is divided into two different phases:
Phase 1 From bits of the intercepted sequence and using the CA-based linear
models, additional bits of the shrunken sequence can be reconstructed.
Phase 2 Due to the intrinsic characteristics of the shrinking generator, a crypt-
analytic attack can be mounted in order to determine the initial states of
the LFSRs. The attack makes use of both intercepted bits as well as
reconstructed bits.
Both phases will be considered separately.
5.1 Reconstruction of output sequence bits
Given r bits of the shrunken sequence z0, z1, z2, ..., zr−1 , we can assume with-
out loss of generality that this sub-sequence has been generated at the most
left extreme cell of any of its corresponding CA. That is xt1 = z0, x
t+1
1 =
z1, ..., x
t+r−1
1 = zr−1. From r bits of the shrunken sequence, it is always pos-
sible to reconstruct r− 1 sub-sequences {xti} of lengths r− i+1 at the i-th cell
of each automaton such as follows:
xti = Φi−1(x
t
i−2, x
t
i−1, x
t+1
i−1) (1 < i ≤ r), (10)
where Φi−1 corresponds to either rule 90 or 150 depending on the value of Ri−1.
From r intercepted bits, the application of equation (10) gives rise to a total of
(r+(r−1)+. . .+2+1) bits that constitute the first chained sub-triangle notated
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∆1, see Table 2. Now, if any sub-sequence {xti} is placed at the most left extreme
cell, then r− 2i+2 bits are obtained at the i-th cell in the second chained sub-
triangle notated ∆2. Repeating recursively n times the same procedure, r−ni+n
bits are obtained at the i-th cell in the n-th chained sub-triangle notated ∆n.
Table 2 shows the succession of 4 chained sub-triangles constructed from r = 10
bits of the shrunken sequence {zi} = {0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1} and first rules
R1 = R2 = 0. In fact, the 10 initial bits generate 8 bits at the third cell in
∆1. These 8 bits are placed at the most left extreme cell producing 6 new bits
at cell 3 in ∆2. With these 6 bits, we get 4 additional bits in ∆3. Finally,
2 new bits are obtained at cell 3 in the sub-triangle ∆4. Since rules 90 and
150 are additive, the generated sub-sequences will be sum of elements of the
shrunken sequence. General expressions can be deduced for the elements of any
sub-sequence in any chained sub-triangle. In fact, the i-th sub-sequence in the
n-th chained sub-triangle includes the bits zj corresponding to the exponents of
(Pi−1(x))
n where Pi−1(x) is the characteristic polynomial of the sub-automaton
R1R2...Ri−1, see equation (2). More precisely, for the previous example the
characteristic polynomial of the sub-automaton R1R2 is P2(x) = x
2 + 1. Then
(P2(x))
2 = x4 + 1, (P2(x))
3 = x6 + x4 + x2 + 1, (P2(x))
4 = x8 + 1, . . . Hence,
xt3 in the different sub-triangles will take the form:
xt3 = z0 + z2 in ∆1
xt3 = z0 + z4 in ∆2
xt3 = z0 + z2 + z4 + z6 in ∆3
xt3 = z0 + z8 in ∆4 . . .
For the successive bits xt+13 , x
t+2
3 , . . . it suffices to add 1 to the previous subindexes.
Table 3 shows the general expressions of the sub-sequence elements in ∆1 and
∆2 for the example under consideration.
On the other hand, Lemmas (3.1) and (3.2) show us that the shrunken
sequence is the interleaving of 2(L1−1) different shifts of an unique PN-sequence
of length 2L2 − 1 whose characteristic polynomial P (x) is given by equation
(7). Consequently, the elements of the shrunken sequence indexed zdi, with
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2L2 − 2} and d = 2(L1−1), belong to the same PN-sequence. Thus,
if the element xti of the i-th sub-sequence in the n-th chained sub-triangle takes
the general form:
xti = zk1 + zk2 + . . .+ zkj (11)
with
kl ≡ 0 mod 2
(L1−1) (l = 1, . . . , j), (12)
then xti can be rewritten as
xti = zkm , (13)
with zkm satisfying equation (12). Therefore, {x
t
i}, the i-th sub-sequence in
the n-th chained sub-triangle, is just a sub-sequence of the shrunken sequence
shifted a distance δ from the r bits of the intercepted sequence. The value of
δ depends on the extension field GF (2L2) generated by the roots of P (x). In
14
Table 2: Reconstruction of 4 chained sub-triangles from 10 bits of the shrunken
sequence
∆1 : R1 R2 R3 . . . ∆2 : R1 R2 R3 . . .
0 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . .
0 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
1 1
1
∆3 : R1 R2 R3 . . . ∆4 : R1 R2 R3 . . .
1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . .
0 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1
1
Table 3: General expressions for different sub-sequences in ∆1 and ∆2 with
R1 = R2 = 0
∆1 : R1 R2 R3 . . . ∆2 : R1 R2 R3 . . .
z0 z1 z0 + z2 . . . z0 + z2 z1 + z3 z0 + z4 . . .
z1 z2 z1 + z3 z1 + z3 z2 + z4 z1 + z5
z2 z3 z2 + z4 z2 + z4 z3 + z5 z2 + z6
z3 z4 z3 + z5 z3 + z5 z4 + z6 z3 + z7
z4 z5 z4 + z6 z4 + z6 z5 + z7 z4 + z8
z5 z6 z5 + z7 z5 + z7 z6 + z8 z5 + z9
z6 z7 z6 + z8 z6 + z8 z7 + z9
z7 z8 z7 + z9 z7 + z9
z8 z9
z9
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brief, the chained sub-triangles enable us to reconstruct additional bits of the
shrunken sequence from bits of the intercepted sequence.
The number of reconstructed bits depends on the amount of intercepted bits.
Indeed, if we know Nl bits in each one of the PN-sequence shifts, then the total
number of reconstructed bits is given by:
2(L1−1)∑
l=1
Nl∑
k=2
(
Nl
k
)
(14)
The required amount of intercepted sequence is 2L1−1 that is exponential in the
length of the shortest register SR1. Remark that in this reconstruction process
both reconstructed bits as well as their positions on the shrunken sequence are
known with absolute certainty.
5.2 Reconstruction of LFSR Initial States
We denote by IS1 = (a0, a1, a2, . . . , aL1−1) the initial state of SR1 and by IS2 =
(b0, b1, b2, . . . , bL2−1) the initial state of SR2. In order to avoid ambiguities on
the initial states, it is assumed that a0 = 1, thus the first element of the shrunken
sequence is z0 = b0. In this way, the goal of this attack is to determine the sub-
vectors (a1, a2, . . . , aL1−1) as well as (b1, b2, . . . , bL2−1).
According to equation (3), the period of the shrunken sequence is T = (2L2−
1) 2(L1−1), so that such a sequence can be written as an (2L2 − 1) × (2(L1−1))
matrix whose elements are the bits of the shrunken sequence. Its columns
are denoted by C1, C2, . . . , C2(L1−1) , respectively. Each column of the matrix
is the PN-sequence above referenced starting at different points. In addition,
the first column C1 corresponds to the decimation of the sequence {bi} from
SR2 by a factor (2
L1 − 1) [11]. Thus, we can compute the position of the bits
b1, b2, . . . , bL2−1 on such a column. Indeed, the i-th bit, bi, is at the ji − th
position of C1 where ji is solution of the equation:
ji (2
L1 − 1) ≡ i mod 2L2 − 1 (i = 1, . . . , L2 − 1). (15)
Moreover, the bits of IS1 determine the initial bits of the subsequent columns
Ci such as follows:
Hypothesis 1 If the first bits of IS1 are (a0 = 1, a1 = 1), then C2 will start
at the j1 − th position of C1 given by equation (15).
Hypothesis 2 If the first bits of IS1 are (a0 = 1, a1 = 0, a2 = 1), then C2 will
start at the j2 − th position of C1 given by equation (15).
...
Hypothesis n If the first bits of IS1 are (a0 = 1, a1 = 0, . . . , an−1 = 0, an = 1),
then C2 will start at the jn − th position of C1 given by equation (15).
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We can formulate different hypothesis covering the first bits of IS1 as well
as each new hypothesis determines the initial bit of the following column. As
we have intercepted and reconstructed bits in the columns Ci, we can check
the previous hypothesis until getting a contradiction. In that case, all the IS1
starting with the wrong configuration must be rejected. The search continues
through the configurations of ai free of contradiction by formulating new hy-
pothesis. In brief, the attacker has not to traverse an entire search tree including
all the initial states of SR1, but the search is concentrated exclusively on the
configurations not exhibiting contradiction with regard to the available bits. In
this sense, the proposed attack reduces considerably the exhaustive search over
the initial states of SR1 as many contradictions occur at the first levels of the
tree. On the other hand, the bits of the register SR2 are easily determined as
the starting bits of C2, C3, C4, . . . in each one of the non-rejected branches. An
illustrative example of Phases 1 and 2 is presented in the next subsection.
5.3 An Illustrative Example
Let us consider a shrinking generator with the following parameters: L1 = 4,
L2 = 5, C1(x) = 1 + x
3 + x4 and C2(x) = 1 + x + x
3 + x4 + x5. According
to equation (7), we can compute the polynomial P (x) = 1 + x + x2 + x4 + x5
while the two basic automata 1 0 0 0 0 and 0 0 0 0 1 are obtained from
the algorithm of Cattell and Muzio. The corresponding CA of length L =
40 are computed via the algorithm developed in section 3. Indeed, they are
CA1 = 0060110600 and CA2 = 8C0300C031 in hexadecimal notation. In ad-
dition, let α be a root of P (x) that is α5 = α4 + α2 + α + 1 as well as a
generator element of the extension field GF (2L2). The period of the shrunken
sequence is T = (2L2 − 1) · 2(L1−1) = 248 and the number of interleaved PN-
sequences is 2(L1−1) = 8. Finally, the intercepted sequence of length r = 24 is:
{z0, z1, . . . , z23} ={1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1}. With
the previous premises, we accomplish Phases 1 and 2.
Phase 1:
For CA1 The chained sub-triangles provide the following reconstructed bits.
For i = 3, sub-automaton R1R2 and P2(x) = x
2 + 1.
• In ∆4, xt3 = z0 + z8, x
t+1
3 = z1 + z9, . . . , x
t+15
3 = z15 + z23. Consid-
ering z0, z8 as the first and second element of the PN-sequence and
keeping in mind that in GF (2L2) the equality 1 + α = α19 holds, we
get xt3 = z19·8 = z152, x
t+1
3 = z153, . . . , x
t+15
3 = z167. Thus, 16 new
bits of the shrunken sequence have been reconstructed at positions
152, 153, . . . , 167.
• In ∆8, xt3 = z0 + z16, x
t+1
3 = z1 + z17, . . . , x
t+7
3 = z7 + z23. As
1 + α2 = α7, we get xt3 = z7·8 = z56, x
t+1
3 = z57, . . . , x
t+7
3 = z63.
Thus, 8 new bits of the shrunken sequence have been reconstructed
at positions 56, 57, . . . , 63.
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For CA2 The chained sub-triangles provide the following reconstructed bits.
For i = 3, sub-automaton R1R2 and P2(x) = x
2 + x+ 1.
• In ∆8, xt3 = z0 + z8 + z16, x
t+1
3 = z1 + z9 + z17, . . . , x
t+7
3 = z7 +
z15 + z23. As 1 + α + α
2 = α23, we get xt3 = z23·8 = z184, x
t+1
3 =
z185, . . . , x
t+7
3 = z191. Thus, 8 new bits of the shrunken sequence
have been reconstructed at positions 184, 185, . . . , 191.
After Phase 1, the known bits of the shrunken sequence are depicted in Table 4.
Rows 0,1,2 correspond to intercepted bits while rows 7, 19, 20 and 23 correspond
to reconstructed bits. The symbol − represents the unknown bits. In brief, from
24 intercepted bits a total of 32 bits have been reconstructed.
Table 4: The shrunken sequence produced by the shrinking generator described
in subsection 5.3.
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
2 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
3 − − − − − − − −
4 − − − − − − − −
5 − − − − − − − −
6 − − − − − − − −
7 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
8 − − − − − − − −
9 − − − − − − − −
10 − − − − − − − −
11 − − − − − − − −
12 − − − − − − − −
13 − − − − − − − −
14 − − − − − − − −
15 − − − − − − − −
16 − − − − − − − −
17 − − − − − − − −
18 − − − − − − − −
19 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
20 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
21 − − − − − − − −
22 − − − − − − − −
b4 23 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
24 − − − − − − − −
b3 25 − − − − − − − −
26 − − − − − − − −
b2 27 − − − − − − − −
28 − − − − − − − −
b1 29 − − − − − − − −
30 − − − − − − − −
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Phase2: According to equation (15), the bits b1, b2, b3, b4 are placed at
positions 29, 27, 25, 23 of column C1, respectively (see the first column of Table
4). On the other hand, Table 5 shows the sequences corresponding to the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 If the first bits of IS1 are (a0 = 1, a1 = 1), then C2 will start
at the 29th position of C1 given rise to the column H1. In row 2, H1
and C2 have a common bit without contradiction. The union of both
sequences allows us to construct C12 the second column of the matrix for
this hypothesis. A total of 13 bits are then known in C12 .
Hypothesis 2 If the first bits of IS1 are (a0 = 1, a1 = 0, a2 = 1), then C2 will
start at the 27th position of C1 given rise to the column H2. In row 23,
H2 and C2 have a common bit with contradiction (starred bits). Thus,
the initial states of SR1 starting with bits 101 must be rejected.
Hypothesis 3 If the first bits of IS1 are (a0 = 1, a1 = 0, a2 = 0, a3 = 1), then
C2 will start at the 25
th position of C1 given rise to the column H3. In
row 7, H3 and C2 have a common bit without contradiction. The union of
both sequences allows us to construct C32 the second column of the matrix
for this hypothesis. A total of 13 bits are then known in C32 .
Hypothesis 4 If the first bits of IS1 are (a0 = 1, a1 = 0, a2 = 0, a3 = 0, a4 =
1), then C2 will start at the 23
th position of C1 given rise to the column
H4. In row 0, H2 and C2 have a common bit with contradiction (starred
bits). Thus, the initial state of SR1 1000 must be rejected.
On the hypothesis free of contradiction, we can formulate other ones depicted
in Table 6
Hypothesis 5 If the first bits of IS1 are (a0 = 1, a1 = 1, a2 = 1), then C3 will
start at the 27th position of C1 given rise to the column H5. In row 23,
H5 and C3 have a common bit with contradiction (starred bits). Thus,
the initial states of SR1 starting with bits 111 must be rejected.
Hypothesis 6 If the first bits of IS1 are (a0 = 1, a1 = 1, a2 = 0, a3 = 0, a4 =
1), then C3 will start at the 23
th position of C1 given rise to the column
H6. Bits 24 and 25 of C1 have been deduced from C
1
2 in Hypothesis 1. In
row 2, H6 and C6 have a common bit with contradiction (starred bits).
Thus, the initial state of SR1 1100 must be rejected.
From Hypothesis 5 and 6, Hypothesis 1 must be rejected. Remark that the
configuration (a0 = 1, a1 = 0, a2 = 0, a3 = 1) in Hypothesis 3 is the only one
free of contradiction. Thus, it corresponds to the actual initial state of SR1.
The successive bits of SR1, that is the PN-sequence {1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, . . .},
are checked by the successive columns C4, C5, . . . , C8 of the shrunken sequence.
Concerning the initial state of SR2, in Table 6 (column Solution) we can see
that bits b4, b3, b2 can be obtained from the known bits of C1 in rows 23, 25 and
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Table 5: Different hypothesis formulated on the bits of SR1
C1 H1 C2 C
1
2 C1 H2 C2 C1 H3 C2 C
3
2 C1 H4 C2
0 1 − 0 0 1 − 0 1 − 0 0 1 1∗ 0∗
1 1 − 0 0 1 − 0 1 − 0 0 1 − 0
2 1 1 1 1 1 − 1 1 − 1 1 1 − 1
3 − 1 − 1 − − − − − − − − − −
4 − 1 − 1 − 1 − − − − − − − −
5 − − − − − 1 − − − − − − − −
6 − − − − − 1 − − 1 − 1 − − −
7 0 − 1 1 0 − 1 0 1 1 1 0 − 1
8 − − − − − − − − 1 − 1 − 1 −
9 − 0 − 0 − − − − − − − − 1 −
10 − − − − − − − − − − − − 1 −
11 − − − − − 0 − − − − − − − −
12 − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
13 − − − − − − − − 0 − 0 − − −
14 − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
15 − − − − − − − − − − − − 0 −
16 − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
17 − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
18 − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
19 0 − 0 0 0 − 0 0 − 0 0 0 − 0
20 0 − 1 1 0 − 1 0 − 1 1 0 − 1
21 − 0 − 0 − − − − − − − − − −
22 − 0 − 0 − − − − − − − − − −
23 1 − 1 1 1 0∗ 1∗ 1 − 1 1 1 − 1
24 − − − − − 0 − − − − − − − −
25 − 1 − 1 − − − − 0 − 0 − − −
26 − − − − − − − − 0 − 0 − − −
27 − − − − − 1 − − − − − − 0 −
28 − − − − − − − − − − − − 0 −
29 − − − − − − − − 1 − 1 − − −
30 − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4
27 respectively. In fact, b4 = 1, b3 = 0, b2 = 1. The bit b1 in row 29 satisfies the
equality
b1 = z29·8 = z1·8 + z2·8 + z4·8, (16)
as α+α2+α4 = α29 in the extension field GF (2L2). We know that z8 = 1, z16 =
1 while z32 can be easily deduced from the equality z14·8 = z1·8+z4·8 as 1+α
4 =
α14. Thus, z32 = 1 + 1 = 0 and substituting in b1 we get b1 = 1 + 1 + 0 = 0.
The final issues of Phases 1 and 2 are the initial states of both LFSRs
IS1 = (a0, a1, . . . , a3) = (1, 0, 0, 1) and IS2 = (b0, b1, . . . , b4) = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1).
From the knowledge of both initial states the whole shrunken sequence can be
reconstructed.
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Table 6: Different hypothesis formulated on the bits of SR1
C1 H5 C3 C1 H6 C3 C1 C
3
2
0 1 − 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 − 0 1 0 0 1 0
2 1 − 0 1 1∗ 0∗ 1 1
3 − − − − − − − −
4 − 1 − − 0 − − −
5 − 1 − − 0 − − −
6 − 1 − − 0 − − 1
7 0 − 1 0 − 1 0 1
8 − − − − 1 − − 1
9 − − − − 1 − − −
10 − − − − 1 − − −
11 − 0 − − − − − −
12 − − − − − − − −
13 − − − − − − 0 0
14 − − − − − − 1 −
15 − − − − 0 − − −
16 − − − − − − − −
17 − − − − − − 1 −
18 − − − − − − − −
19 0 − 1 0 − 1 0 0
20 0 − 0 0 − 0 0 1
21 − − − − − − − −
22 − − − − − − − −
23 1 0∗ 1∗ 1 − 1 1 1
24 − 0 − 0 − − − −
25 − − − 1 − − 0 0
26 − − − − − − 0 0
27 − 1 − − 0 − 1 −
28 − − − − 0 − − −
29 − − − − − − − 1
30 − − − − − − − −
Hypothesis 5 Hypothesis 6 Solution
5.4 Computational Features
The computational complexity of the previous cryptanalytic attack can be con-
sidered in two different phases: off-line and on-line complexity.
Off-line computational complexity: This phase is to be executed before in-
tercepting sequence. It includes:
• Computation of the characteristic polynomials Pi(x) of the sub-automata
R1R2 . . . Ri (1 < i ≤ l) by means of equation (2) where l is related to
the amount of intercepted sequence (l · 2L1−1 ∼ r). This computation is
necessary in order to obtain general expressions for the elements of the
chained sub-triangles in the reconstruction procedure.
• Computation of the positions of the bits bi (i = 1, 2, . . . , L2−1) on C1 the
first column of the shrunken sequence matrix by means of equation (15).
This computation is necessary in order to determine the bits of the initial
state of SR2.
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• Computation of different elements of the extension field GF (2L2) such as
1+α, 1+α2, . . . , 1+αNl and linear combinations of them by means of the
Zech log table method [1] for arithmetic over GF (2m). This computation
is necessary in order to determine the distance between the intercepted
sequence and the portions of reconstructed shrunken sequence.
On-line computational complexity: This phase is to be executed after in-
tercepting sequence. According to the previous subsections, the computational
method consists in the comparison of series of bits coming from formulated hy-
pothesis and from intercepted/reconstructed bits. The comparison is realized by
means of bit-wise logical operations so the computational complexity is rather
low. Occasionally, the computation of the any element of GF (2L2) must be re-
alized in order to determine additional elements of the PN-sequences. The most
consuming time of this cryptanalytic attack is the search over the 2L1−1 possible
initial states of SR1 (supposed a0 = 1). Due to contradictions found in the first
levels of the search tree, the exhaustive search can be dramatically improved.
On average, we can say that in the worst case the search can be reduced to
the half, so that the computational complexity of this attack is O(2L1−2). In
addition, several considerations must be kept in mind:
1. The improved exhaustive search is carried out over the state space of the
shortest register SR1.
2. Every checking of hypothesis is realized only over the 1′s of the configu-
ration under consideration, then the procedure speeds for configurations
with a low number of 1′s.
Finally, comparing the proposed attack with those ones found in the liter-
ature we get that all of them are exponential in the lengths of the registers.
In particular, the complexity of the divide-and-conquer attack proposed in [23]
is O(2L1). The probabilistic correlation attack described in [13] has a com-
putational complexity of O(L22 · 2
L2). Also the probabilistic correlation attack
introduced in [14] is exponential in L2. In this work a deterministic attack
has been proposed that improves the complexity of the previous cryptanalytic
approaches.
6 Conclusions
This paper considers the linearization of pseudorandom sequence generators
based on finite fields. More precisely, a wide family of traditional LFSR-based
sequence generators, the so-called Clock Controlled Shrinking Generators, has
been analyzed and modelled in terms of linear cellular automata. In this way,
sequence generators conceived and designed as complex nonlinear models can
be written in terms of simple linear models. An easy algorithm to compute the
pair of one-dimensional linear hybrid cellular automata that generate the CCSG
output sequences has been derived. The key idea of this modelling is just the
concatenation of a basic structure repeated a number of times. In addition, a
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cryptanalytic attack that reconstructs the output sequence of such generators
has been proposed too. The cryptanalytic approach is deterministic and im-
proves an exhaustive search over the states of the shortest register. Computing
the initial state of the longest register is a direct consequence of the previous
step. The attack exploits the linearity of these CA-based models as well as the
characteristics of this class of generators. Applying the same schemes, we can
develop linear cellular automata-based models to analyze/cryptanalyze wider
classes of clock-controlled generators.
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